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California's Response for Wrongful Death of a
Stillborn Fetus: Justus v. Atchison
INTRODUCTION
The law governing the area of prenatal injuries has developed
rapidly over the last thirty years,1 with the primary impetus
being a federal district court ruling in 1946 which permitted a
child to recover damages for personal injuries sustained prior
to birth.2 Although prior to that time only a very few juris-
dictions in the United States allowed recovery for damages
under such circumstances,3 since the decision, virtually every
jurisdiction has upheld this type of action.4
The law of prenatal torts continued its development with the
granting of recovery for the wrongful death of an infant who
was born alive, but died shortly thereafter due to prenatal in-
juries,5 and, in 1949,6 with the successful maintenance of a suit
for the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus.7 Although numerous
1. Prosser refers to this as "what was up till that time the most spectacular
abrupt reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history of the law of torts." W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 336 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
2. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946). For a discussion of the
importance of this case, see: 62 AM. JUR. 2d Prenatal Injuries § 2 (1972); PROS-
SER, supra note 1, at 335. Also, it should be noted the dissenting opinion of
Boggs, J., in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900), which
has been often cited, was an important factor in changing the legal thinking in
this area.
3. In Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678, hear. denied, 33
Cal. App. 2d 640, 93 P.2d 562 (1939), California permitted a child to recover for
prenatal injuries based upon a statute protecting the rights of unborn children.
4. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 337. For a position maintaining some states
still do not allow this cause of action, see 62 AM. JUR. 2d Prenatal Injuries § 3
(1972). Also, in his work on wrongful death, Speiser notes four states which
denied recovery in very early cases. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
§ 4:29 (1966). Only one jurisdiction is mentioned as not having allowed recovery
in Annot., 40 A.L.R. 3d 1222, 1251-52 (1971).
5. Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923). Although this case was
decided in 1923, it was not released for publication until 1949.
6. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
7. A fetus is a developing human from usually three months after concep-
tion to birth. A stillborn child is one that is born dead. See 62 AM. JUR. 2d
courts have since created a cause of action for the wrongful
death of a stillborn fetus, 8 California has consistently refused to
do so and has once again upheld that precedent in Justus v.
Atchison.9
DISCUSSION OF THE CASE
In Justus, two factually similar cases were joined on appeal,
both of which involved Joseph Atchison, M.D., as one of the
defendants. In each case, plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought
a wrongful death suit against Dr. Atchison based upon allega-
tions of negligence during delivery which resulted in the still-
born birth of their child. Defendants' demurrer to this count in
each action was sustained without leave to further amend. The
trial court then entered a judgment of dismissal against plain-
tiffs.10
Prenatal Injuries § 1 (1972). However, for purposes of this note, fetus is used to
include the embryonic stage from conception to three months.
8. At the time the California Supreme Court decided the case under dis-
cussion, the following courts had allowed a cause of action for wrongful death
of a stillborn fetus: Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974)
(Alabama); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1974)
(Connecticut); Worgan v. Greggo and Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557
(1956) (Delaware); Simmons v. Howard University, 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (District of Columbia); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100
(1955) (Georgia); Christafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88
(1973) (Illinois); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971) (Indiana);
Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962) (Kansas); Mitchell v. Couch, 285
S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); accord, Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1970) (Kentucky);
Valence v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1951) (Louisia-
na); State v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964) (Maryland); Mone v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975) (Massachusetts); O'Neill v.
Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971) (Michigan); Verkennes v. Corniea,
229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); accord, Pehrson v. Kirstner, 301 Minn. 299,
222 N.W.2d 334 (1974) (Minnesota); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434
(1954) (Mississippi); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969) (Nevada);
Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957) (New Hampshire);
Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 11 Ohio Op. 2d 383, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959)
(Ohio); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976) (Oklahoma); Libbee v. Per-
manente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974) (Oregon); Presley v. Newport
Hospital, 365 A.2d 636 (R.I. 1976) (Rhode Island); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C.
608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); accord, Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th
Cir. 1964) (South Carolina); Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597,527 P.2d 266 (1975)
(Washington); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431,184 S.E.2d 428 (1971); accord,
Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969) (West Virginia);
Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14,148 N.W.2d 107 (1967)
(Wisconsin).
9. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977) [hereinafter Justus].
Earlier, in Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (3d Dist. 1954)
[hereinafter Norman], the court refused to allow a cause of action for wrongful
death of a stillborn fetus, but, as to be discussed, the court in Justus criticized
the rationale upon which the ruling was based.
10. Justus v. Atchison, supra note 9.
[Vol. 5: 589, 1978] Wrongful Death
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Thus, the issue on appeal was whether the Supreme Court of
California would reverse an earlier appellate court decision 1
and allow a cause of action for wrongful death of a stillborn
fetus. The court, in its refusal to do so, based its decision almost
entirely upon legislative intent and declined to discuss the poli-
cy considerations set forth by plaintiffs. The rationale was:
The considerations advanced by plaintiffs would be relevant if we
were called upon to decide whether California should adopt the pro-
posed cause of action as a matter of judge-made law; they are not
persuasive when, as here, the cause of action for wrongful death in
this state is a pure creature of statute. 2
As observed in the opinion, at least one jurisdiction held
wrongful death to be of common law origin owing to the history
of its evolution in the United States. 13 The question of whether
or not wrongful death was to be considered a common law
cause of action in California, however, was declared moot. In-
stead, legislative intent to preempt the field was found to exist,
regardless of the nature of the action. 14
To arrive at this conclusion, the court examined the original
wrongful death statute of 186215 and its successor, Section 377 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure. 16 Due to the fact the
11. Norman v. Murphy, supra note 9.
12. Justus v. Atchison, supra note 9, at 571, 565 P.2d at 127, 139 Cal. Rptr. at
102.
13. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970), the United States
Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for wrongful death under general
maritime law, thus casting some doubt on the issue of whether or not a cause of
action for wrongful death existed at common law. Based upon this, the Mas-
sachusetts court concluded state law on the subject "has also evolved to the
point where it may now be held that the right to recovery for wrongful death is
of common law origin." Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, -, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229
(1972).
14. Justus v. Atchison, supra note 9, at 575, 565 P.2d at 129,139 Cal. Rptr. at
104.
15. 1862 CAL. STATS. ch. 330, p. 447.
16. CAL. CIv. Paoc. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1977):
"(a) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another, his or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may main-
tain an action for damages against the person causing the death, or in case of the
death of such wrongdoer, whether the wrongdoer dies before or after the death
of the person injured. If any other person is responsible for any such wrongful
act or neglect, the action may also be maintained against such other person, or
in case of his or her death, his or her personal representatives. In every action
under this section, such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of
the case, may be just, but shall not include damages recoverable under Section
573 of the Probate Code. The respective rights of the heirs in any award shall be
determined by the court. Any action brought by the personal representatives of
legislators meant to create an entirely new cause of action and
later made numerous and detailed amendments thereto, it was
held the legislature intended to occupy the field. Therefore, in
the court's eyes, wrongful death remained a creature of statute
and existed "only so far and in favor of such person as the
legislative power may declare."' 17
As a prelude to its own interpretation of the wrongful death
statute, the court discussed the interpretation found in Norman
v. Murphy,18 the first California decision to treat the issue. The
applicable statute for both Norman and Justus authorized a
cause of action for wrongful death "[W]hen the death of a per-
son not being a minor, or when the death of a minor person who
leaves surviving him either a husband or wife or child or chil-
dren or father or mother, is caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another" (emphasis added).19 The entire decision in
Norman was based upon the meaning of the word "minor" as
found elsewhere in the Code.20 The court in Justus criticized
this use of the definition of "minor" because it felt the legisla-
ture intended it to "facilitate computation not of the beginning
but of the end of the period of minority. '21 Also, as noted in the
the decedent pursuant to the provisions of Section 573 of the Probate Code may
be joined with an action arising out of the same wrongful act or neglect brought
pursuant to the provisions of this section and a separate action arising out of the
same wrongful act or neglect be brought pursuant to the provisions of Section
573 of the Probate Code, such actions shall be consolidated for trial on the
motion of any interested party.
"(b) For the purposes of subdivision (a), "heirs" mean only the following:
"(1) Those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the
decedent according to the provisions of Division 2 (commencing with Section
200) of the Probate Code, and
"(2) Whether or not qualified under paragraph (1), if they were dependent on
the decedent, the putative spouse, children of the putative spouse, stepchildren,
and parents. As used in this paragraph, "putative spouse" means the surviving
spouse of a void or voidable marriage who is found by the court to have believed
in good faith that the marriage to the decedent was valid.
"Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to change or modify the defini-
tion of "heirs" under any other provision of law."
17. Pritchard v. Whitney Estate Co., 164 Cal. 564, 568, 129 P. 989, 992 (1913),
as quoted in Justus v. Atchison, supra note 9, at 575, 565 P.2d at 129, 139 Cal.
Rptr. at 104.
18. Supra note 9.
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West 1973).
20. In Norman, supra note 9, the court used the definition of "minor" as
found in CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 25-26 (West 1954). In Section 25, at that time, a minor
was anyone under twenty-one years of age. Section 26, as it still does, provided:
"The periods specified in the preceding section must be calculated from the first
minute of the day on which persons are born to the same minute of the corre-
sponding day completing the period of minority." Reading these two provisions
together, the court held Section 26 prescribed the moment at which the state of
minority began, thus excluding fetuses from the class of "minor persons."
21. Justus v. Atchison, supra note 9, at 576, 565 P.2d at 130,139 Cal. Rptr. at
105.
[Vol. 5: 589, 1978] Wrongful Death
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
opinion, the legislature had since deleted "minor person" and
made the statute generally applicable to the death of a "per-
son."22 Therefore, the court determined "person" to be the
gravamen word for purposes of interpreting the wrongful death
statute.
23
An examination of the specific areas in which the legislature
had conferred legal personality on the unborn formed the basis
for the final stage of the court's analysis. The court reviewed
Civil Code Section 29,24 the primary section dealing with the
legal interests involved, and also discussed the code sections
having to do with property25 and support26 rights of the unborn
22. "As noted ... the 1862 predecessor to section 377 created a cause of
action for the wrongful death of 'a person.' That broad designation was retained
in section 377 when it was originally enacted as part of the 1872 Code of Civil
Procedure. In 1873, the Legislature narrowed the section by limiting its applica-
tion to the death of 'a person not being a minor,' i.e., of an adult only. (Code
Amends. 1873-1874, ch. 383, § 40, p. 294.) In 1935 the section was broadened to
include 'a minor person,' but only if he was survived by a spouse, child, or
parent. (Stats. 1935, ch. 108, § 1, p. 460.) And in 1975 the Legislature abandoned
the latter limitation, deleted the reference to 'a minor person' as surplusage, and
once again made the statute generally applicable to the death of 'a person.'
(Stats. 1975, ch. 334, § 1, p. 783...)." Id. at 576-77, 565 P.2d at 130, 139 Cal. Rptr. at
105.
23. Id. at 577, 565 P.2d at 130, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
24. CAL. CIv. CODE § 29 (West 1954):
"A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person, so far
as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth; but any
action by or on behalf of a minor for personal injuries sustained prior to or in
the course of his birth must be brought within six years from the date of birth of
the minor, and the time such minor is under any disability mentioned in Section
352 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not be excluded in computing the time
limited for the commencement of the action."
25. The court reviewed the following sections dealing with the posthumous
child: CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 1956) (to be considered as living at the death
of a parent); CAL. PROB. CODE § 71, 90 (West 1956) (entitled to be included among
pretermitted heirs); CAL. PROB. CODE § 123 (West 1956) and CAL. CIV. CODE § 698
(West 1954) (can inherit a future interest); CAL. CIV. CODE § 739 (West 1954) (can
defeat a future interest in another). However, none of these rights vests unless
and until the child is born alive. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 29 (West 1954), supra note
24, and CAL. PROB. CODE § 123 (West 1956).
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1977):
"If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish
necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care
for his or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail
not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment. If a court of
competent jurisdiction has made a final adjudication in either a civil or a
criminal action that a person is the parent of a minor child and the person has
notice of such adjudication and he or she then willfully omits, without lawful
as well as murder of a fetus. In each instance, the court found
an explicit intent to provide for the unborn and concluded:
[T]hat when the legislature determines to confer legal personality on
unborn fetuses for certain limited purposes, it expresses that intent in
specific and appropriate terms; the corollary, of course, is that when
the Legislature speaks generally of a "person," as in section 377, it
impliedly but plainly excludes such fetuses.
28
Further, the court declined to acknowledge that the remedial
excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter, medical attendance or other
remedial care for his or her child, this conduct is punishable by imprisonment in
the county jail not exceeding one year or in a state prison not exceeding one year
and one day, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both
such fine and imprisonment. This statute shall not be construed so as to relieve
such parent from the criminal liability defined herein for such omission merely
because the other parent of such child is legally entitled to the custody of such
child nor because the other parent of such child or any other person or organiza-
tion voluntarily or involuntarily furnishes such necessary food, clothing, shelter
or medical attendance or other remedial care for such child or undertakes to do
SO.
"Proof of abandonment or desertion of a child by such parent, or the omission
by such parent to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attend-
ance or other remedial care for his or her child is prima facie evidence that such
abandonment or desertion or omission to furnish necessary food, clothing,
shelter or medical attendance or other remedial care is willful and without
lawful excuse.
"The court, in determining the ability of the parent to support his or her child,
shall consider all income, including social insurance benefits and gifts.
"The provisions of this section are applicable whether the parents of such
child are or were ever married or divorced, and regardless of any decree made
in any divorce action relative to alimony or to the support of the child. A child
conceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person insofar as this
section is concerned.
"The husband of a woman who bears a child as a result of artificial insemina-
tion shall be considered the father of that child for the purpose of this section, if
he consented in writing to the artificial insemination.
"If a parent provides a minor with treatment by spiritual means through
prayer denomination, by a duly accredited practitioner thereof, such treatment
shall constitute 'other remedial care,' as used in this section."
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1977):
"(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
aforethought.
"(b) This section shall not apply to any person who commits an act which
results in the death of a fetus if any of the following apply:
"(1) The act complied with the Therapeutic Abortion Act, Chapter 11
(commencing with Section 25950) of Division 20 of the Health and Safety Code.
"(2) The act was committed by a holder of a physician's and surgeon's certifi-
cate, as defined in the Business and Professions Code, in a case where, to a
medical certainty, the result of childbirth would be death of the mother of the
fetus or where her death from childbirth, although not medically certain, would
be substantially certain or more likely than not.
"(3) The act was solicited, aided, abetted, or consented to by the mother of
the fetus.
"(c) Subdivision (b) shall not be construed to prohibit the prosecution of any
person under any other provision of law."
28. Justus v. Atchison, supra note 9, at 579, 565 P.2d at 132, 139 Cal. Rptr. at
107.
[Vol. 5: 589, 1978] Wrongful Death
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
purpose of the wrongful death statutes warranted a liberal
construction, for it felt the clarity of the legislative intent left no
room for such liberality. Therefore, it held a fetus was not a
"person" within the meaning of the statute.2 9
Finally, the equal protection argument forwarded by plain-
tiffs was rebuffed. The wrongful death statute was originally
intended to compensate for economic loss and deprivation of
consortium. The court held, therefore, that the lack of great
economic loss due to the death of a fetus provided a rational
basis for the legislative classification. 30
Although no justice dissented, Acting Chief Justice Tobriner,
concurring, declined to follow the court's rationale. He agreed
with the decision in Gaudette v. Webb 31 that the cause of action
for wrongful death had reached a level whereby it could be
considered of common law origin. Thus, he would have based
the opinion, not upon legislative intent, but upon the policy
reasons as set forth by plaintiffs and defendants.
32
WHERE CALIFORNIA STANDS AMONG OTHER STATES
As hereinbefore mentioned, at the time of the Justus decision,
twenty-five states recognized a cause of action for wrongful
death of a stillborn fetus.3 3 This trend began in 1949 with Ver-
kennes v. Corniea34 which reversed an earlier line of decisions
stemming from Dietrich v. Northampton.3 5 In Dietrich, Justice
Holmes denied recovery due to both the lack of precedent and,
as he held, the fact an unborn child had no separate existence
from its mother.3 6 Dietrich formed the basis for a series of
opinions which denied, not only recovery for wrongful death,
but also for personal injuries sustained by a fetus subsequently
born alive. However, the turning point occurred in 1946 when a
federal district court ruled a child could maintain an action for
29. Id. at 580, 565 P.2d at 133, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
30. Id. at 581, 565 P.2d at 134, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
31. 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972).
32. Justus v. Atchison, supra note 9, at 586-87, 565 P.2d at 136-37, 139 Cal.
Rptr. at 111-12.
33. Supra note 8.
34. Supra note 6.
35. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
36. Id. at 17. This was based upon the idea that "the defendant could owe no
duty of conduct to a person who was not in existence at the time of his action."
PROSSER, supra note 1, at 335.
personal injuries suffered prior to birth.37 Verkennes soon fol-
lowed, along with several other cases allowing recovery for
prenatal torts.
Courts have advanced numerous reasons since Verkennes for
upholding wrongful death actions for stillborn fetuses, one of
which maintained, based upon the much-cited twin hypothe-
sis, 38 the unreasonableness of allowing the wrongful death suit
when a child, born alive, died moments thereafter, but not al-
lowing the action for a stillborn child.39 To this, others respond-
ed by pointing out the difficulties arising whenever a line must
be drawn in law, further reasoning that moving this line of
demarcation to an earlier point in time, such as viability,40 in-
creased the problems of determining causation and damages. 41
The unequal treatment afforded the unborn in law has also
been stressed as a reason to allow a cause of action. It was
contended once the law recognized the unborn for purposes of
protecting their property and inheritance rights and for protect-
ing them from crimes, then it should have recognized them for
purposes of wrongful death. 42 As rebuttal to this argument,
courts observed that property rights are contingent upon live
birth.43
The purpose of the tort was analyzed in an attempt to de-
cipher whether it would be consistent to uphold a cause of
action for wrongful death of a stillborn fetus. Some asserted to
allow recovery for personal injury but not for wrongful death
would create an anomaly,44 as the tortfeasor would be released
37. Bonbrest v. Kotz, supra note 2.
38. This hypothesis was designed to show the unfairness of allowing recov-
ery to be dependent upon live birth. It postulated that if a woman, pregnant with
twins, was injured, and one died before birth and one after birth, it would be
absurd to allow recovery for the latter but not the former. Stidam v. Ashmore,
109 Ohio App. 431, 11 Ohio Op. 2d 383, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
39. See, e.g., Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir, 1964);
Stidam v. Ashmore, supra note 38.
40. Viability is the stage at which a fetus has developed sufficiently to be
able to live outside of its mother's womb, either under normal conditions, or,
according to some authorities, even if only in an incubator. Generally, this
occurs between the sixth and seventh months of pregnancy. See 62 AM. JUR. 2d
Prenatal Injuries § 1 (1972).
41. Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1969).
42. Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., supra note 39; Kwaterski v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
43. Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); Endresz v.
Friedberg, supra note 41; Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221
(1958).
44. Personal injury as used here refers to the situation where a child may
bring an action for personal injuries suffered as a fetus.
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from liability by inflicting a more serious harm which resulted
in death rather than in a simple injury.45 Thus, there would be a
wrong without a remedy.46 Although many courts felt the par-
ents should have some compensation for the loss of the child,47
others insisted punishment to the tortfeasor in the form of dou-
ble recovery would result, as some damages were recoverable
as part of the parents' general damages. 48 Finally, many deci-
sions to allow the cause of action were based simply upon the
concept that wrongful death statutes were intended to be reme-
dial and, hence, to be construed liberally.49
Although when the Supreme Court of California handed
down Justus twenty-five jurisdictions had allowed this cause of
action, there were still at least twelve which had not.50 A concern
expressed in many cases was the possibility of double recovery
which would have, in effect, constituted punishment to the tort-
feasor.51 As hereinbefore discussed, this contention was ground-
ed on the supposition that most of the damages recoverable by
45. Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., supra note 39.
46. Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 42; Todd v.
Sandidge Constr. Co., supra note 39.
47. Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 42.
48. Norman v. Murphy, supra note 9; Endresz v. Friedberg, supra note 41.
49. Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969).
50. At the time the Supreme Court of California decided Justus, the follow-
ing jurisdictions still did not allow recovery for wrongful death of a stillborn
fetus: Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1974) (Arizona); Norman
v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (3d Dist. 1954) (California); Stokes v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); accord, Davis v. Simpson, 313
So. 2d 796 (Fla. App. 1975); but see Miller v. Highlands Ins. Co., 336 So. 2d 636
(Fla. App. 1976) (recognized a cause of action under a different statute than that
in Stokes) (Florida); McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971) (Iowa);
State ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976) (Missouri); Drabbels v.
Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W. 2d 229 (1951) (Nebraska); Graf v. Taggert, 43
N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (New Jersey); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478,
248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969) (New York); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C.
394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); accord, Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 213
S.E.2d 382 (1975); Yow v. Nance, 29 N.C. App. 419, 224 S.E.2d 292 (1976) (North
Carolina); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964); accord, Marko v.
Philadelphia Transportation Co., 420 Pa. 124,216 A.2d 502 (1966) (Pennsylvania);
Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958); accord, Durrett v.
Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963) (Tennessee); Lawrence v. Craven
Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969) (Virginia).
51. In these cases, the courts did not feel damages awarded to punish the
tortfeasor were within the type of recovery wrongful death was intended to
provide. See, e.g., Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v.
Friedberg, supra note 41; Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
the parents under wrongful death were also recoverable as gen-
eral damages.52
Furthermore, courts expressed a reluctance to deal with the
difficulties inherent in such a suit in establishing causation and
determining damages.53 To this, many responded with the ac-
cusation the courts were avoiding their responsibilities.
Whether or not to allow a cause of action, they felt, should not
have been determined on the complexity of the issue involved;
after all, the legal system was established to make complex and
difficult decisions.
54
Historically, wrongful death was viewed as having a statu-
tory, not common law origin.5 Because of this, construction of
the pertinent statute was uppermost in importance, sometimes
even to the point of ignoring policy considerations. Thus, some
courts, as did California in Justus, 6 relied exclusively upon
statutory construction in denying recovery by finding a fetus
not to be a "person" within the wrongful death statute.
REQUIREMENTS OF VIABILITY AND LIVE BIRTH
Once the courts began to permit actions for prenatal torts,
52. Norman v. Murphy, supra note 9; Endresz v. Friedberg, supra note 41.
However, even though the mother has an action for her own miscarriage, this
technically does not include damages for the loss of the child. See: Annot., 15
A.L.R. 3d 992, 1005 (1967); PROSSER, supra note 1, at 338. Also, since the actions
arising from the wrongful death and the mother's personal injury would prob-
ably be consolidated for trial, adequate jury instructions should prevent a dou-
ble recovery.
53. See, e.g., Graf v. Taggert, supra note 51, which was decided upon a
statute limiting damages to pecuniary loss. The court held damages in this
instance to be too speculative due to the difficulty in determining pecuniary loss.
See also Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966), which was
decided upon interpretation of a similar statute; and Endresz v. Friedberg,
supra note 41, in which the court felt to allow recovery would increase the
problems of causation and damages.
54. Cooper v. Blanck, supra note 5.
"So far as causation is concerned, there will certainly be cases in which there
are difficulties of proof, but they are no more frequent, and the difficulties, are
no greater than as to many other medical problems." PROSSER, supra note 1, at
336.
55. Justus v. Atchison, supra note 9, at 572-75, 565 P.2d at 128-29, 139 Cal.
Rptr. at 102-04.
56. Justus v. Atchison, supra note 9.
57. Since most wrongful death statutes were enacted before recovery was
allowed for prenatal injuries, courts argued wrongful death of a stillborn fetus
could not have been within the contemplation of the legislature. Therefore, they
concluded any changes made should be statutory. See, e.g., Norman v. Murphy,
supra note 9 (not a "minor person"); Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra note
43 (not a "minor child"); Endresz v. Friedberg, supra note 41 (not a "decedent");
Hogan v. McDaniel, supra note 43 (not a "person"). See also: PROSSER, supra
note 1, at 338; 62 AM. JUR. 2D Prenatal Injuries § 16 (1972).
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they were confronted with an entirely new set of problems.
Among the foremost of these was the question of whether a
cause of action would arise if injury occurred to the fetus at any
time during the pregnancy or whether the point of viability
must have been reached prior to injury. Viability was defined as
that point in time when the fetus had developed sufficiently to
live outside the mother's womb.58
One of the first cases to allow recovery to a child who had
suffered prenatal injuries held the fetus had to have been viable
at the time of the tort.59 In general, other early cases followed
suit, and, for a time, viability was considered necessary in both
personal injury and wrongful death actions.0
Nonetheless, the viability requirement gradually fell into dis-
favor with several courts for a variety of reasons.61 Not only was
viability a difficult issue to determine, 62 but with the advance of
medical science, it was also considered outmoded. That is, many
deemed the child to be biologically separate from the mother
from the time of conception, not viability. 3 In addition, courts
concluded that a claim for an injury prior to viability was no
less meritorious than a claim for one sustained afterward. 4
58. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 337; 62 AM. JUR. 2d Prenatal Injuries § 1 (1972).
59. Bonbrest v. Kotz, supra note 2.
60. "Since the original case denying a right of recovery for prenatal in-
juries, Dietrich v. Northampton [cite omitted], was based on the view that the
unborn child is a part of the mother, it was naturally easier to demonstrate the
fallacy of that view with respect to viable fetuses-which by definition are
capable of living apart from the mother-than to do so for nonviable fetuses.
Hence, courts frequently limited their first decision in favor of actions for
prenatal injuries to those involving injury to a viable fetus." Annot., 40 A.L.R. 3d
1222, 1227 n.16 (1971).
61. Cases allowing recovery in a personal injury action when viability was
not met include: Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d
727 (1956), conformed to 94 Ga. App. 328, 94 S.E.2d 523 (1956); Daley v. Meier, 33
Ill. App. 2d 218,178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483,147 A.2d
108 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Sinkler v. Kneale,
401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76,220 A.2d 222 (1966).
62. Viability depends on many variables and is often difficult to determine.
See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, supra note 61. See also: 62 Am. JUR. 2d Prenatal
Injuries § 6 (1972); PROSSER, supra note 1, at 337.
63. Sinkler v. Kneale, supra note 61. See also: PROSSER, supra note 1, at 337;
Annot., 40 A.L.R. 3d 1222, 1227-28 (1971).
64. Smith v. Brennan, supra note 61; Sylvia v. Gobeille, supra note 61. The
rationale for allowing recovery for prenatal injuries is the right of a child to
start life free from the effects of another's wrongdoing. This should hold true
whether or not the fetus is viable at the time of the injury.
Although the requirement of viability was discarded as it
pertained to personal injury actions of a surviving child,65
courts were less willing to do away with it in wrongful death
suits, especially those involving stillborn fetuses.6 6 Concern
about adequate proof of causation prompted the latter reluct-
ance.67 However, at least one court allowed recovery for wrong-
ful death of a stillborn fetus injured before reaching viability.68
Another yardstick employed by courts in determining
whether or not a cause of action existed was live birth. An
action for personal injuries sustained while a fetus, of course,
always carried with it the necessity for live birth.69 Initially, live
birth was also considered a necessary element of wrongful
death,7" although later, many courts supplanted live birth with
viability. The inevitable confusion between live birth and viabil-
ity resulted, and courts were often unclear as to which one was
required and when.
In California, the position of the courts has been less than
clear. The first case to allow recovery for prenatal personal
injuries sustained by a child subsequently born alive, Scott v.
McPheeters,71 discussed viability but made no definite pro-
nouncement as to whether or not it was required. However, the
decision was based entirely upon an interpretation of Civil Code
Section 29, which began: "A child conceived, but not yet born, is
to be deemed an existing person. . . . "72 A literal reading of this
65. See supra note 61. For a discussion of cases where viability may still be
required in personal injury actions, see Annot., 40 A.L.R. 3d 1222, 1244-51 (1971).
66. Courts requiring viability in a wrongful death action include: Prates v.
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 487, 118 A.2d 633 (1955); Louisville v.
Stuckenborg, 438 S.W.2d 94 (Ky. 1968); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258
S.W.2d 577 (1953); Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950); Leal v.
C.C. Pitts Sand and Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967).
Courts denying recovery for death of a nonviable fetus include: Mace v. Jung,
210 F. Supp. 706 (D: Alaska 1962); Rapp v. Hiemenz, 107 Ill. App. 2d 382, 246
N.E.2d 77 (1969); West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958).
67. According to Prosser, recovery should not be denied on such an arbi-
trary basis as viability when there are injuries for which sufficient medical
proof exists. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 338.
68. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955). However, recov-
ery was conditioned upon a showing that the child was "quick," i.e., capable of
moving or stirring in its mother's womb.
69. Keyes v. Constr. Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960).
70. Almost all courts allow maintenance of a wrongful death suit when a
child who was injured as a fetus is born alive and dies thereafter. For a discus-
sion of this, see: Annot., 40 A.L.R. 3d 1222, 1255-61 (1971); 62 AM. JUR. 2d Prenat-
al Injuries § 12 (1972); S. SPEISER, supra note 4, at §,4:31. However, as noted in the
above references, recovery is often predicated upon viability at the time of the
injury.
71. Supra note 3.
72. CAL. CIv. CODE § 29 (West 1954). For text, see supra note 24.
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indicated no need for viability, and, according to Prosser,73 this
has been the position followed in California. This author found
no case since Scott in which the issue of viability was litigated
for a personal injury action; therefore, viability has evidently
not been demanded in this instance.
As hereinbefore discussed, Norman v. Murphy74 was the first
California case to decide whether live birth was a necessary
element in a wrongful death action. It, of course, denied recov-
ery because the fetus was stillborn.7 Cases reaffirming this
decision included Bayer v. Suttle76 and Tyrrell v. City and
County of San Francisco.77 Once again, in Justus,78 the Su-
preme Court of California held live birth to be necessary.
Dicta in Justice Brown's dissent in Bayer indicated California
would uphold a wrongful death action for a child who died after
birth due to injuries inflicted prenatally.79 There was also lan-
guage to this effect in Justus.80 However, whether viability at
the time of the injury would be required in this particular in-
stance has remained in doubt.
INTERPRETING JUSTUS IN LIGHT OF ROE V. WADE
In Roe v. Wade,81 the United States Supreme Court held a
fetus not to be a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment; 82 that is, a fetus was declared to have no constitu-
tionally protected right to life. The decision in Justus 83 that a
fetus was not a "person" within the wrongful death statute was,
therefore, totally consistent with Roe.
Obviously, the inconsistency would have arisen had the
California court reached an opposite conclusion. To allow re-
covery for wrongful death of a stillborn fetus, while at the same
73. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 337 n.31.
74. Supra note 9.
75. Id.
76. 23 Cal. App. 3d 361, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212 '(st Dist. 1972).
77. 69 Cal. App. 3d 876, 138 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1st Dist. 1977).
78. Justus v. Atchison, supra note 9.
79. Bayer v. Suttle, supra note 76, at 367, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
80. Justus v. Atchison, supra note 9, at 570, 565 P.2d at 126,139 Cal. Rptr. at
101.
81. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) [hereinafter Roe].
82. Id. at 158.
83. Justus v. Atchison, supra note 9.
time denying that fetus Fourteenth Amendment protection, was
to many irreconcilable. The United States Supreme Court ob-
served this seeming incongruity and formulated an explanation
to allow compatibility.84 In dicta, it was suggested that the dam-
ages awarded in such a wrongful death action in actuality vin-
dicated the right of the unborn child's parents to recover for
their loss. This was considered the only policy which was consis-
tent with the view that the fetus, at most, represented merely the
potentiality of life.85
One possible solution occurred to those trying to reconcile the
holding of Roe with permitting a cause of action for wrongful
death of a stillborn fetus. This involved the Supreme Court's
ruling as to the third trimester, a time roughly commensurate
with viability. The decision expressly granted states the right to
adopt laws promoting their interests in the potentiality of life
represented by the fetus in the third trimester.86 As noted, the
Court indicated a willingness to consider recovery by the par-
ents in a wrongful death action of a stillborn fetus consistent
with its decision. 87 Therefore, by expressly including the latter
action in their wrongful death statutes in order to protect par-
ental interests and limiting it to viable fetuses, states were given
a means of allowing recovery while still remaining within the
Roe decision.88
SUGGESTED FUTURE LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN CALIFORNIA
Beginning in 1951, with Norman v. Murphy,8 9 California
courts have consistently refused to create a cause of action for
wrongful death of a stillborn fetus. The most recent case to so
hold, Justus v. Atchison,"0 was decided, as were all the other
decisions, upon an interpretation of legislative intent. Even
though the legislature has altered the wrongful death statute on
numerous occasions, it has never included a fetus within the
definition of "person."91 This, combined with the courts' un-
animity of approach, would seem to indicate no change to be
forthcoming in California law, at least in the immediate fu-
84. Roe v. Wade, supra note 81, at 162.
85. Id. at 157. See also Note, Wrongful Death and the Unborn: An Examina-
tion of Recovery After Roe v. Wade, 13 J. FAM. L. 99 (1973-74).
86. Roe v. Wade, supra note 81, at 163.
87. Id. at 162.
88. Note, Wrongful Death and the Unborn, supra note 85, at 109-10.
89. Supra note 9.
90. Supra note 9.
91. Supra note 22.
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ture 2 However, if and when such an amendment is made, it will
probably be as a result of legislative decision.
Most certainly, the law has developed rapidly in this area.
And, by all appearances, its evolution has not as yet concluded.
According to Speiser:
There is little doubt that the trend of authority is toward permitting
recovery both for non-fatal and fatal prenatal injuries resulting in
stillborn fetuses. The opinions of the recent cases permitting recovery
are by far the better reasoned ones. It also seems to be the trend that
the requirement of viability will be scrapped as courts begin to accept
the notion that a child is an entity, or a "person" from the moment of
conception, and that as such is entitled to be protected as is every
other person.9 3
With the law in such a state of flux, it seems likely the question
of whether or not to create a cause of action for wrongful death
of a stillborn fetus could come before the legislature before
long. 4
Once confronted with this issue, the legislature's first task will
be to examine the wrongful death statute and determine
whether or not creating such a cause of action would be consis-
tent with the stated purposes of the statute. Even if the legisla-
ture answers this in the negative, it should consider broadening
the scope of the statute to include this cause of action. However,
the latter step should be unnecessary as it is well within the
spirit of the wrongful death statute to allow recovery for wrong-
ful death of a stillborn fetus.
In the preamble to the progenitor of today's wrongful death
statutes, the Lord Campbell's Act, the rationale for the action is
stated thusly:
Whereas, no action at law is now maintainable against a person who,
by his wrongful act, neglect or default, may have caused the death of
another person, and it is often expedient ... that the wrongdoer in
such case should be answerable in damages for the injury so caused
by him.9 5
92. An interesting position was taken by Justice Brown in his dissent in
Bayer v. Suttle. He maintained the legislature was unaware of the decision in
Norman v. Murphy, and, therefore, legislative inaction on the subject should not
have been interpreted as passive approval of the decision. Bayer v. Suttle,
supra note 76, at 366-67, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
93. S. SPEISER, supra note 4, at § 4:33.
94. Given the accuracy of Justice Brown's dissent in Bayer v. Suttle, see
supra note 92, it would seem more likely that the issue will come before the
legislature now that there is a California Supreme Court case.
95. 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, as quoted in TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT §
20 (2d ed. 1913).
Wrongful death statutes, once directed primarily at recovery for
actual pecuniary loss occasioned by a death 96 and strictly
construed by the courts,97 have been interpreted more liberally
in recent years.98 Damages can now include loss of consortium
in addition to those originally awarded for economic loss.99 In
Justus, the court maintains there is no economic loss experi-
enced by the parents of a stillborn fetus. Therefore, only loss of
consortium remains, which is regarded by the court as being too
trivial to be considered. 100 Nonetheless, loss of consortium is an
element of damages allowed in California in a wrongful death
suit,' 1 and it should not be dismissed so readily. In his strong
dissent in Bayer v. Suttle, Justice Brown takes the latter posi-
tion:
I also take issue with this reasoning. The damages and loss are real.
Themother's claim for general damages for her injury does not em-
brace the real loss-the deprivation of parenthood. [cite omitted] If
Norman is followed, there would be no recovery for the loss of the
comfort and society of the child, an element of damages recoverable
under the wrongful death statute.102
In recent years, many courts, including the Supreme Court of
California, have frequently stated that the wrongful death stat-
utes are "remedial" and should be construed liberally. 03 Given
this liberal construction and loss of consortium as a bona fide
element of damages, it is completely within the ambit of the
wrongful death statute to allow a cause of action for wrongful
death of a stillborn fetus.
Furthermore, it is generally held that a mother's action does
not include damages for the loss of the child. 10 4 Thus, if recovery
96. "[T]he action proceeds on the theory of compensating the individual
beneficiaries for loss of the economic benefit which they might reasonably have
expected to receive from the decedent in the form of support, services or contri-
butions during the remainder of his lifetime if he had not been killed." PROSSER,
supra note 1, § 127 at 906.
97. Prosser suggests that the reason the original English statute and the
subsequent American statutes were strictly construed was because of fear of
over-sympathetic juries. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 127 at 907.
98. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 127 at 907-09.
99. 62 AM. JuR. 2d Prenatal Injuries § 23 (1972); PROSSER, supra note 1, § 127
at 908; S. SPEISER, supra note 4, at § 3:42.
100. Justus v. Atchison, supra note 9, at 581, 565 P.2d at 134,139 Cal. Rptr. at
109.
101. Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal. 2d 1, 187 P.2d 752 (1947); Young v. Fresno
Flume and Irr. Co., 24 Cal. App. 286, 141 P. 29 (1st Dist. 1914). See also Bayer v.
Suttle, supra note 76, at 368, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
102. Bayer v. Suttle, supra note 76, at 367-68, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17.
103. Justus v. Atchison, supra note 9, at 579-80,565 P.2d at 133, 139 Cal. Rptr.
at 108.
104. Thomas v. Gates, 126 Cal. 1, 58 P. 315 (1899). See also: Annot., 15
A.L.R.3d 992, 1005 (1967); PROSSER, supra note 1, at 338 n.35; 62 AM. JUR. 2d
Prenatal Injuries § 24 (1972); and supra note 52.
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cannot be had under wrongful death, there does exist a wrong
without a remedy. In essence, the tortfeasor is released from
liability for inflicting a fatal injury as opposed to one which
would merely harm the fetus. Although a separate cause of
action could be created to grant recovery to the mother for loss
of a stillborn fetus, this is an unnecessary duplication of effort
when the framework already exists within the wrongful death
statute.
105
Unquestionably, problems of double recovery and difficulties
of proof are inherent in allowing recovery for wrongful death of
a stillborn fetus. They are not, however, insurmountable. In
order to avoid double recovery by the mother, both her action
for personal injuries and the wrongful death action should be
combined in one trial. Careful and adequate jury instructions
can then be used to prevent an unjust award to the mother.
Although the two actions would ordinarily be tried together, 10 6
such can be ensured by including an appropriate provision in
the statute.
The difficulties of proof involved are not unlike those found
with many other torts.10 7 Advancements in medical science have
enabled physicians to pinpoint the cause of death of a fetus
more accurately than before. 10 8 Since the jury is permitted to
decide complicated questions of proximate cause and remote-
ness in other intricate tort cases, they should also be deemed
capable to determine similar issues arising in a wrongful death
action of a stillborn fetus.
Furthermore, creation of this cause of action is a logical corol-
lary to the other two prenatal torts herein discussed: (1) person-
al injury action by a child subsequently born alive and (2)
wrongful death action for a child born alive but dying shortly
105. See Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., supra note 39, at 78, where the court,
in refusing to consider this as a part of the mother's action, observed that this
would not account for the father's anguish.
106. 1 C.J.S. 2d Actions § 111 (1936). Note that the wrongful death statute,
California Civil Procedure Code Section 377 (for text, see supra note 16) already
provides for the consolidation of the wrongful death action and any surviving
actions under California Probate Code Section 573.
107. Supra note 67.
108. For an excellent, but slightly dated, discussion of the medical proof of
prenatal torts, see Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relat-
ing to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PENN. L. REV. 554 (1962). See also, S. SPEISER,
supra note 4, at § 4:33.
thereafter. Once the fetus is recognized as a legal entity for
these two actions, it should also be so recognized for purposes of
wrongful death when stillborn.10 9
After the legislature decides to allow a cause of action for
wrongful death of a stillborn fetus, it will also have to grapple
with two subsidiary issues: (1) whether the cause of action is to
be restricted to viable fetuses and (2) whether any provision is to
be made for damages.
As hereinbefore discussed, viability is required in all but one
of the cases authorizing recovery for wrongful death of a still-
born fetus.110 The most frequently cited reason for so limiting
the cause of action is difficulty of proof."' However, viability in
itself is a very complex issue to litigate, and many question its
usefulness." 2 It is also important to note with each of the other
two prenatal torts recognized," 3 viability has been an element of
the tort at the outset which has been later discarded in most
cases.1' 4 In all likelihood, the cause of action for wrongful death
of a stillborn fetus will follow this trend, and viability will no
longer be required." 5 The more logical course for the legislature
to pursue, therefore, is to recognize the fetus as a biologically
and legally separate entity and to allow a cause of action
whether or not viability is present." 6 This will unify the ap-
109. "[O]nce we have accepted the basic proposition that the decedent was a
person at the time of the injury, the substantive rights necessarily resulting from
that fact may surely be enforced, whatever may be the practical difficulties
involved." Stidham v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431,.435, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108
(1959).
110. See supra notes 66-68, and accompanying text.
111. Id.
112. Prosser, when noting the difficulties of proof involved in injuries occur-
ring prior to viability, states: "This, however, goes to proof rather than princi-
ple; and if, as is undoubtedly the case, there are injuries as to which reliable
medical proof is possible, it makes no sense to deny recovery on any such
arbitrary basis." PROSSER, supra note 1, at 337-38.
"The difficulty of proving causation bears no relationship to the viability or
nonviability of the fetus at the time of the accident; rather, the magnitude of the
proof problem varies according to the particular facts of each case." Note, The
Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, supra
note 108, at 563.
See also supra note 67.
113. I.e., a child recovering for prenatal injuries and wrongful death of a
child injured prenatally but subsequently born alive.
114. See discussion supra notes 61-64, and accompanying text.
115. See S. SPEISER, supra note 4, at § 4:33, and as quoted on p. 603, supra.
See also Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to
Prenatal Injuries, supra note 108, at 564.
116. Most of the commentators speak in terms of recognizing the fetus as
legally separate from conception. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 1, at 336, and S.
SPEISER, supra note 4, at § 4:33. However, the definition of "fetus" generally
encompasses the period of gestation from the third month, see supra note 7.
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proach taken towards prenatal torts in that an action will lie for
prenatal injuries and wrongful death regardless of viability.
Although it is not within the scope of this note to discuss
damages in depth, it should be observed that there may be
strong sentiments in favor of limiting recovery by creating a
statutory ceiling due to the speculative nature of the damages
involved. 117 There are those who feel damages in any wrongful
death case are conjectural at best, 118 and this has led some states
to impose limits on all recoveries under wrongful death."19 As of
the present, no such limit has been established in California by
statute.
120
The primary element of damages for both wrongful death of a
minor child and a fetus is the loss of consortium-society and
comfort-and the younger the child, the truer this is.12 1 Because
of this, it has been argued:
It is submitted that the measure of damages now applied universally
in wrongful death cases is inherently a determination involving con-
siderable conjecture, and that this standard applied in prenatal death
cases will produce results no more speculative than those in cases
involving minor children.
122
Therefore, since the legislature has made no limits on recovery
for wrongful death of children, it makes little sense for them to
do so on damages allowable for wrongful death of a stillborn
Therefore, courts and legislatures need to be careful in defining "fetus" as they
determine whether to allow recovery for wrongful death of a stillborn fetus.
If the "fetus" is to be recognized from conception, obviously, there will be
some difficulties encountered as to abortion. Before a physician performs an
abortion, he may be required to have a release signed by the mother as to any
wrongful death rights. More interesting is the question of whether this will be
true of the father, especially in light of the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion which held that a state could not require a father's consent prior to abortion
(Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).
Recognizing the "fetus" from conception will also pose problems vis-a-vis Roe
v. Wade, see discussion supra notes 81-88, and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Anderson, A Model State Wrongful Death Act, 1 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 28 (1964), in which he advocates a $1,000 llmit because of the speculative
nature of the injury.
118. See Note, Prenatal Injuries and Wrongful Death, 18 VAND. L. REV. 847,
854-55 (1964-65).
119. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 104 (1935); S.
SPEISER, supra note 4, at §§ 7:1-7:6.
120. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West 1977). For text, see supra note 16.
121. 62 AM. JUR. 2d Prenatal Injuries § 23 (1972); Note, Prenatal Injuries and
Wrongful Death, supra note 118, at 854-55; PROSSER, supra note 1, § 127.
122. Note, Prenatal Injuries and Wrongful Death, supra note 118, at 855.
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fetus. Furthermore, the courts have been deemed capable of
determining damages in wrongful death cases in the past, and
there is no reason why they cannot continue to assure that
reasonable recoveries are allowed.
CONCLUSION
A proposed modification of the present wrongful death stat-
ute, California Civil Procedure Code Section 377,123 reads:
When the death of a person, or a fetus, is caused by the wrongful act
or neglect of another, his or her heirs or personal representatives on
their behalf may maintain an action for damages against the person
causing the death. ...
It is further suggested: (1) this cause of action should lie whether
or not the fetus is viable at the time of injury and (2) that no
statutory limit on recovery be imposed. In addition, a provision
should be included to the effect that the mother's cause of action
for personal injuries and the wrongful death action are to be
joined at trial when arising out of the same wrongful act or
neglect.
PHYLLIS A. Dow
123. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West. Supp. 1977). For text, see supra note
16.
